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Abstract

Using the Student Investment Fund at Claremont McKenna College as a proxy for
inexperienced investors, I demonstrate that inexperienced investors using fundamental
analysis produce momentum-like buying patterns. The results show that the Student
Investment Fund is on average buying stocks that outperform Carhart’s four-factor asset
pricing model in the year before purchase. As a result, the Student Investment Fund has,
on average, underperformed the S&P500 by .48% per year since 1996. My thesis
explores why the Student Investment Fund may have adopted momentum-like purchasing
patterns and what steps can be taken to remedy it.
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I.

Introduction

Investing icons such as Benjamin Graham and his disciple, Warren Buffett, are
two of the most influential figures in finance. Their success makes them legendary, but
their simple investment approach makes them relatable. Both Graham and Buffett are
major proponents of an investment strategy called fundamental analysis. The relative ease
and accessibility of the strategy cause waves of new investors to try their hand at
investing like Graham,1 employing fundamental analysis to ascertain the intrinsic value
of securities.2
Broadly speaking, fundamental analysis is the process of delving into the financial
statements of a company, determining basic financial ratios, and identifying trends of key
financial metrics to discover undervalued investments. The apparent simplicity of the
strategy attracts newcomers interested in replicating their approach. Ignoring the
vicissitudes of the market, Graham uses fundamental analysis to invest in heavily
discounted assets, which often have severely depressed stock prices. Finding companies
that are trading at significant discounts by scrutinizing public financial filings is the spirit
of fundamental analysis.
If it is as simple as analyzing financial filings and calculating basic accounting
ratios, why can’t inexperienced investors make money like Graham? The answer to this

1

---. Amazon: Editorial Reviews. Accessed November 17, 2016.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Graham. Benjamin Graham’s book, The
Intelligent Investor: The Definitive Book on Value Investing, is often referred to as the
value investor’s bible and has sold over a million copies.
2

Myers, Daniel. "The 3 Most Timeless Investment Principles." Investopedia. 2007.
Accessed November 30, 2016.
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/07/grahamprinciples.asp.

2

question, and the foundation of my thesis, is inexperienced investors, although applying
the same investment methods, are not buying the same types of stocks that Graham
selects for his investments.
To examine what stocks they are buying, I analyze the buying patterns of a
student-run investment fund that exclusively invests using fundamental analysis. My
findings show that the buying patterns of the fund resemble a basic momentum strategy.
Instead of investing in clearly undervalued stocks like Graham, those with large
differences between the stock price and its intrinsic value, the fund buys stocks that have
performed well in recent past, betting they will perform better in the future. While it may
be true that a stock with rising prices may still be undervalued, the likelihood of that
occurrence is less compelling because the margin of error for the analysis is much
smaller.
Momentum is an investment strategy that seeks to capitalize on weak-form
market inefficiency3 by using past prices to predict future prices. Pure momentum
traders4 buy stocks that do well and sell stocks that do poorly over various periods of
time. The idea behind this strategy is that each stock has inertia and thus high performers
will continue to outperform (for a while) and losers continue to underperform (for a

3

Weak-form market efficiency claims that the current price of a stock reflects all past
prices and thus technical analysis cannot be used to predict, and subsequently beat the
market. Some argue that because momentum exists and generates profits, the weak-form
market efficiency hypothesis is incorrect.
I use the term “pure” to distinguish between investors who knowingly invest using
momentum strategies and those that accidentally produce a rudimentary momentum
result, such as the subjects of this study.
4

3

while). Thus, if I distill momentum investing into a simple idea, it is that investors buy
winners (Jageedesh and Titman 1993).5
The purpose of my thesis is twofold. First, I seek to fill the current gap in the
literature. While many studies have examined fundamental analysis (see for example, Ou
and Penman),6 momentum (see for example, Lo and MacKinlay 1989),7 and behavior of
the inexperienced investor (see for example Greenwood and Nagel 2006),8 to the best of
my knowledge no study exists that has examined the causal relationship between all
three. Second, I posit why this relationship occurs and the implications that it has. It takes
focused strategies that carry high amounts of risk to produce abnormal returns utilizing
momentum.9 Even when professional traders explicitly use momentum, it is difficult

5

Jegadeesh, Narasimhan, and Sheridan Titman. "Returns to Buying Winners and Selling
Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency." The Journal of Finance 48, no. 1
(1993): 65. doi:10.2307/2328882. Per Jageedesh and Titman (1993), winners are stocks
that had returns in the top decile. However, the classification of winners varies by
strategy.
6

Ou, Jane A., and Stephen H. Penman. "Financial Statement Analysis and the Prediction
of Stock Returns." Journal of Accounting and Economics 11, no. 4 (1989): 295-329.
doi:10.1016/0165-4101(89)90017-7.
7

Lo, Andrew, and A. Craig MacKinlay. "When Are Contrarian Profits Due to Stock
Market Overreaction?" Review of Financial Studies, 1989. doi:10.3386/w2977.
8

Greenwood, Robin, and Stefan Nagel. "Inexperienced Investors and Bubbles." Journal
of Financial Economics 93, no. 2, 239-58. Accessed December 2, 2016.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.08.004.
9

Lowenstein, Roger. When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital
Management. New York: Random House, 2000. As is the problem with all technically
based investment strategies, they work when the statistical relationships between market
forces hold. In the case of momentum, investors depend on past price patterns to predict
future prices. The spectacular failures of such strategies are well-documented. For
instance, a hedge fun utilizing mostly technical strategies called Long-Term Capital
Management lost $4.6 billion in four months.
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enough to produce abnormal returns.10 Doing so unwittingly makes it nearly impossible.
Unsurprisingly, the SIF has underperformed the S&P500 index since 1996 (average
annual return for the SPX was 7.60% compared to 7.12% for the SIF11). My thesis will
expose, and explain why, rudimentary momentum masquerades as fundamental analysis
among inexperienced investors.
In this case study, I use the Student Investment Fund (SIF) at Claremont
McKenna College (CMC)12 as a proxy for the inexperienced investor employing
fundamental analysis. The SIF is a good choice for my analysis for the following reasons.
First, according to the SIF’s website:
The student investment fund practices ‘bottom-up' investing, using
fundamental analysis of financial and economic information to identify
mispriced securities. Students evaluate vital information including
financial reports, industry comparisons, new regulations, demographic
trends, earnings statements, and economy-wide trends to build discounted
cash flow models and relative valuations to identify potentially mispriced
securities.13

10

Kinnel, Russel. "Why Momentum Funds Don't Have Any." Morningstar. November
29, 2010. Accessed December 2, 2016.
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=361034.
Returns are from the SIF’s trading data and Bloomberg. The difference between the
SIF and SPX returns are insignificant at conventional levels.
11

12

13

Henceforth referred to as “the SIF.”

---. "Our Investment Strategy." CMC Student Investment Fund. Accessed November
28, 2016. http://www.cmcsif.org/index.php/about-us/our-investment-strategy.
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Secondly, even though the SIF is one of the largest student-run investment organizations
in the country,14 its investors are students with very limited investing experience. The
average age of an SIF member is 19 and average years of investing experience are less
than two.
I examine whether the SIF is buying winners based on Carhart's four-factor model
(Carhart 1997)15 by using data from the SIF in conjunction with data from the Wharton
Research Data Services (CRSP) database of stock returns,16 and Ken French’s database.17
If the SIF is buying winners, I then determine how they win – are they loading up on the
momentum factor or are they generating pure alpha, abnormal returns above Carhart's
four-factor model? I find that the SIF has indeed invested in winners, but the momentum
factor does not load. The average monthly alpha in the year before the SIF purchased a
stock was 1%, amounting to annual abnormal returns of 12%, which is significant at the
1% level.

The following information can be found within CMC SIF’s recent presentation called
CMC SIF Advisory Board Presentation (9/30/2016). The SIF at CMC is one of the
largest run student investment funds in the country, managing over $1.7 million in
endowment assets. It is composed of over 45 students and overseen by 15 industry
professionals, a faculty advisor, and the Chief Investment Officer (CIO) of CMC.
14

15

Carhart, Mark M. "On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance." The Journal of
Finance 52, no. 1 (1997): 57. doi:10.2307/2329556.
16

---. "Wharton Research Data Services." Wharton Research Data Services. Accessed
November 28, 2016. https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/.
17

French, Ken R. "Kenneth R. French - Data Library." Kenneth R. French - Data Library.
Accessed November 28, 2016.
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.

6

I organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing
literature on fundamental analysis, momentum, and behavior of inexperienced investors.
Sections 3 and 4 examine the data and my strategy and results, respectively. I present my
conclusions in the final section.
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II.

Literature Review

While there is a significant amount of literature on momentum, fundamental
analysis, and the inexperienced investor, to the best of my knowledge there are no studies
that seek to find a causal relationship between fundamental analysis and momentum for
the inexperienced investor. As previously noted, the first purpose of my paper is to
address the missing intersection between the three strands of literature. Before I attempt
to do this, I will discuss each strand of literature in turn.
The first strand of literature focuses on momentum. Momentum is a trading
strategy that capitalizes on the momentum of stocks that are performing well and those
that are performing poorly, offering, as Eugene Fama put it, the “biggest embarrassment
to the [efficiency market hypothesis].”18 Although investment professionals accept
momentum strategies as legitimate,19 there is still debate regarding the source of the
momentum profits.
A popular view in academia, to the despair of Fama, is that momentum profits are
a result of weak-form market inefficiency. Lo and MacKinlay (1989)20 investigate a

18

Asness, Clifford S. "AQR - Fama on Momentum." AQR - Fama on Momentum.
February 5, 2016. Accessed November 29, 2016. https://www.aqr.com/cliffsperspective/fama-on-momentum. Eugene Fama conceived of the efficient market
hypothesis.
19

See footnote five above. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that by buying certain
stocks that had performed well in the past and selling stocks that had not performed well
in the past, one could generate abnormal excess returns over 3-12 month periods. They
argue that employing such strategies has become a distinct and popular trading strategy in
the United States.
20

See footnote seven above.
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contrarian strategy of selling winners and buying losers. They find that weekly portfolio
returns are positively autocorrelated and that returns of large capitalization stocks lead the
returns of small capitalization stocks. As such, they argue that overreaction in the markets
is the sole source of contrarian profits. Overreaction by investors would imply markets
are inefficient since stock prices are either inflated or depressed based on sentiments, not
based on facts about the stock. One could take advantage of this by merely analyzing past
stock prices.
Another study that sought to prove momentum was an indicator of market
inefficiency was Bondt and Thaler (1985),21 who find that over long time horizons (three
to five years), stocks that had performed poorly in the past outperformed those that had
done well. Their main finding was that the market was weak-form inefficient; and,
similar to Lo and MacKinlay’s (1989)22 conclusion, investors tend to overreact to bad
news in a way that makes predicting future stock prices based on past stock prices
possible. The procedure in Further, Grundy, and Martin (2001)23 illustrates that since
1926, using momentum strategies-- buying recent winners and selling recent losers-guarantees returns that are more profitable than those based on total returns. Chan,

21

Bondt, Werner F. M. De, and Richard Thaler. "Does the Stock Market Overreact?" The
Journal of Finance 40, no. 3 (1985): 793-805. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05004.x.
22

23

See footnote seven above.

Further, Grundy, and J. Spencer Martin. "Understanding the Nature of the Risks and
the Source of the Rewards to Momentum Investing." SSRN Electronic Journal SSRN
Journal, 2001. doi:10.2139/ssrn.94049.

9

Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1995)24 try to explain the success of momentum strategies as
a function of the market underreacting to current information. The results suggest that
investors could generate significant returns using the stock’s prior six-month performance
and most recent earning surprise over the next six months. Additionally, studies such as
Barberis, Schleifer and Vishny (1997),25 Daniel, Hirshliefer, and Subrahmanyam
(1998),26 and Hong and Stein (1999)27 find momentum profits are generated because of
inherent biases in how investors process information.
Despite the papers seeking to prove momentum profits are a result of capitalizing
on market inefficiency, others try to prove momentum returns are simply compensation
for hidden risk. Conrad and Kaul (1998),28 Lo and MacKinlay (1989),29 and Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993)30 all argue that when controlling for certain risks, excess returns from

24

Chan, Louis K., Narasimhan Jegadeesh, and Josef Lakonishok. "Momentum
Strategies." The Journal of Finance, 1995. doi:10.3386/w5375.
25

Barberis, Nicholas, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. "A Model of Investor
Sentiment." Journal of Financial Economics, 1997. doi:10.3386/w5926.
26

Daniel, Kent, David Hirshleifer, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam. "Investor Psychology
and Security Market Under- and Overreactions." The Journal of Finance 53, no. 6 (1998):
1839-885. doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00077.
27

Hong, Harrison, and Jeremy C. Stein. "A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum
Trading, and Overreaction in Asset Markets." The Journal of Finance 54, no. 6 (1999):
2143-184. doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00184.
28

Conrad, Jennifer, and Gautam Kaul. "An Anatomy of Trading Strategies." Rev. Financ.
Stud. Review of Financial Studies 11, no. 3 (1998): 489-519. doi:10.1093/rfs/11.3.489.
29

See footnote seven above.

30

See footnote five above.
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momentum are explainable. Additionally, some thought momentum was not an anomaly
or reward for risk-taking but a result of data mining. For instance, Levy (1967)31 finds
that buying stocks at prices greater than their 27-week average lead to excess abnormal
returns. However, a study by Jensen and Bennington (1970)32 questioned the results,
arguing data mining33 was responsible for producing the result. Nevertheless, if
momentum profits are simply a result of taking on additional risk, then its returns can be
controlled for in an asset pricing model. Carhart (1997)34 creates a four-factor model that
attempts to do just that, controlling for price momentum by using a momentum factor.
Thus, Carhart's four-factor model is the benchmark I use in my analysis.
Although the literature regarding momentum is well-developed, none posit that
momentum can be achieved unwittingly through fundamental analysis. In other words,
the literature has focused on its viability as a strategy and source of its profits. Although
the purpose of the paper is to not explicitly take a side in this debate, because of my
usage of Carhart's four-factor model, I implicitly assume it is a risk factor. My paper

31

Levy, Robert A. "Relative Strength As A Criterion For Investment Selection." The
Journal of Finance 22, no. 4 (1967): 595-610. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1967.tb00295.x.
32

Jensen, Michael C., and George A. Bennington. "Random Walks and Technical
Theories: Some Additional Evidence." The Journal of Finance 25, no. 2 (1970): 469.
doi:10.2307/2325495.
33

Fama, Eugene F. "Efficient Capital Markets: II." The Journal of Finance 46, no. 5
(1991): 1575. doi:10.2307/2328565. Data mining as described by Fama (1991): “With
clever researchers on both sides of the efficiency fence, rummaging for forecasting
variables, we are sure to find instances of ‘reliable’ return predictability that are in fact
spurious.” Essentially, data mining finds returns by comparing pseudo-anomaly
portfolios with real anomaly portfolios, finding false correlations.
34

See footnote 15 above.
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explores how an investor, attempting to utilize fundamental analysis to invest in
undervalued companies, could produce a momentum-like result.
The second strand of existing literature focuses on fundamental analysis and
whether it can yield excess returns. It seems that no paper has investigated a causal
relationship between fundamental analysis and momentum. Abarbanell and Bushee
(1998)35 find that fundamental analysis of inventories, effective tax rates, audit
qualifications, accounts receivable, gross margins, selling expenses, and other
fundamental metrics yield an average 12-month cumulative size-adjusted abnormal
return. Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek and Sloan (2001)36 show that fundamental analysis
can be used by short-sellers to identify firms likely to exhibit lower expected future
returns. Finally, Ou and Penman (1989)37 argue that fundamental analysis successfully
identifies equity values that are not currently valued in the stock price. However in
response, Greig (1992)38 re-examined Ou and Penman (1989)39 and found that once an
investor controls for certain risk factors, there is no incremental predictive ability in an

35

Abarbanell, Jeffery S., and Brian J. Bushee. "Abnormal Returns to a Fundamental
Analysis Strategy." SSRN Electronic Journal SSRN Journal, 1998.
doi:10.2139/ssrn.40740.
36

Dechow, Patricia M., Amy P. Hutton, Lisa K. Meulbroek, and Richard G. Sloan.
"Short Interests, Fundamental Analysis, and Stock Returns." SSRN Electronic Journal
SSRN Journal, 2001. doi:10.2139/ssrn.167154.
37

See footnote six above.

38

Greig, Anthony C. "Fundamental Analysis and Subsequent Stock Returns." Journal of
Accounting and Economics 15, no. 2-3 (1992): 413-42. doi:10.1016/01654101(92)90026-x.
39

See footnote six above.

12

earnings increase. In total, research regarding fundamental analysis as an investment
strategy is well-developed, but its connection to momentum is left unanalyzed.
Although relatively underdeveloped compared to the other two strands, the third
strand of literature dissects various behavioral patterns of inexperienced investors.
Greenwood and Nagel (2006)40 found younger investors were more likely to buy stocks
at the peak of the Internet bubble as compared to older investors. They posit
inexperienced investors are more influenced by sentiment. Further, Peterson (2002)41
argues that inexperienced investors are more likely to succumb to behavioral impulses
than experienced investors. Finally, Sorensen (2007)42 says experienced venture
capitalists, investors that subsidize the creation and growth of start-up companies, are
82% more likely to succeed on an investment than inexperienced investors. Overall, the
body of literature on inexperienced investors suggests they are susceptible to market
sentiments and their performance is worse than those with more experience.
By arguing that momentum is an unintended consequence of fundamental
analysis, my thesis seeks to marry the three strands of literature together in a novel way.
My thesis will provide the opportunity for numerous other studies that explore questions
including, but not limited to: does the type of fundamental analysis materially impact
buying patterns? Does momentum, generated by fundamental analysis, actually produce

40

See footnote eight above.

41

Peterson, Richard L. "Buy on the Rumor and Sell on the News." Risk Management,
2006. doi:10.1016/b978-012088438-4.50030-7.
42

Sorensen, Morten. "How Smart is Smart Money? A Two-Sided Matching Model of
Venture Capital." 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01291.x.
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abnormal returns? What type of momentum is generated by fundamental analysis? Does
fundamental analysis-generated momentum outperform technical analysis-generated
momentum? Does the relationship between fundamental analysis and momentum exist
for experienced investors? My thesis will provide the starting point for a new area of
investigation in financial literature.
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III.

Data

I divided the data section into four parts: an overview of my data set, the structure
of the data that makes my estimation possible, definitions of variables, and limitations of
the data.
I.

Data set construction
I form a custom data set from three different sources to do my analysis: CRSP

database on stock returns, SIF’s trading records, and Ken French’s database. By
combining the essential pieces from each data set, I create a custom data set that provides
all the data needed to perform my analysis. Each independent data set is formed from
reputable sources, and I did not construct any of the factors myself. The final custom data
set includes 82 stocks. For each stock, the data, where available, extends 72 months
before the buy date (see section III.II for more information).

Table 1
Complete data set

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Ticker
Buydate
date
stock_Ret
rf

82
82
4,705
4,705
4,705

0.0229
0.0020

0.1450
0.0018

-0.6203
0.0

1.8273
0.0056

hml
smb
mktrf
mom

4,705
4,705
4,705
4,705

0.0022
0.0025
0.0051
0.0033

0.0327
0.0333
0.0472
0.0566

-0.1125
-0.1717
-0.1723
-0.3458

0.1291
0.2208
0.1135
0.1838

The complete data set is formed by combining SIF’s trading data, CRSP data, and Ken French’s data. All data is monthly
besides Ticker and Buydate.
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The statistic that stands out from a summary of the complete data set is the stock_Ret
variable, which is the raw monthly return of a stock (see section III.III for more
information). The average raw return per month was 2.29%. On an annualized basis, that
is equal to a 27.48% return. In comparison, the excess return of the market was 6.12% on
an annualized basis. So, in raw returns, without controlling for risks, the SIF is buying
stocks that have done exceedingly well in the past.
II.

Data set structure for estimation

My estimation process requires two distinct, data intensive steps. First, calculation of
the factor betas in the pre-event period and second, calculation of the alphas in the prepurchase period (see section IV for more information). To facilitate easier estimation, I
broke up the complete data set into two data sets, one for the pre-event period and one for
the pre-purchase period. The pre-event period data is a subset of the complete data set
(see Table 1) and includes data from 72 months before a stock was purchased (or the
earliest available data) up until 12 months before the buy date. It spans five years before
the pre-purchase period.

16

Table 2
Pre-event period data

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Ticker
Buydate
date
stock_Ret
rf

82
82
3,787
3,787
3,787

0.0233
0.0021

0.1435
0.0018

-0.6203
0.0

1.8273
0.0056

hml
smb
mktrf
mom

3,787
3,787
3,787
3,787

0.0026
0.0027
0.0049
0.0032

0.0330
0.0341
0.0474
0.0571

-0.1125
-0.1717
-0.1723
-0.3458

0.1291
0.2208
0.1135
0.1838

Note: Average length of pre-event period was only 46 months (3,787 / 82) for each stock.

The pre-purchase period data is also a subset of the complete data set (see Table
1) and includes data from 12 months before a stock was purchased up until the
buy date. It spans one year before a stock was purchased.
Table 3
Pre-purchase period data

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Ticker
Buydate
date
stock_Ret
rf

82
82
918
918
918

0.0215
0.0016

0.1511
0.0018

-0.6129
0.0

1.0533
0.0056

hml
smb
mktrf
mom

918
918
918
918

0.0007
0.0018
0.0061
0.0036

0.0312
0.0297
0.0460
0.0543

-0.1125
-0.1717
-0.1723
-0.3458

0.1291
0.2208
0.1135
0.1838

Note: Average pre-purchase period was 11.2 months. However, when the regressions were run to estimate alpha, stocks
without a complete pre-purchase period were dropped.
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Figure 1
Visualization of complete data set

𝑡72 months

𝑡12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠
Pre-event period

𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒

Pre-purchase period

This is a graphical representation of the complete data set. It shows the complete data as a sum of its two component sub
data sets, the pre-event period and the pre-purchase period.

III.

Variable definitions

Buydate
I pulled this variable from SIF’s trading data. It is the date at which the SIF asked
the Chief Investment Officer (CIO) of CMC to purchase a stock. Usually, the stock was
bought a few days later because SIF does not do the physical trading of securities
themselves. Because they must wait for the CIO to approve and execute the transaction,
there is a short delay between when the SIF ordered the stock and when the CIO bought
it. For my analysis, the difference of a few days is insignificant. I chose to use the ordered
date instead of the transacted date because that is the day the SIF would theoretically
have bought if they were executing trades themselves.
stock_Ret
I pulled this variable from CRSP for each stock. It is defined as the change in the
total value of an investment in a common stock over some period per dollar of initial

18

investment.43 For my purposes, it is a monthly return.44 Excess security return subtracts
the risk-free rate from the stock_Ret (𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓 ).
Benchmark variables
The benchmark I use to evaluate whether certain stocks are generating abnormal
returns is Carhart's four-factor model. Carhart (1997)45 created his model when he
extended the Fama-French three-factor model, an asset pricing model that sought to
explain the variability in stock prices based on three factors, to include a momentum
factor.
hml:
Pulled from Ken French’s database, hml is the first of four factors used to
calculate Carhart's four-factor benchmark. It measures the value factor, the
company's price-to-book ratio. Over the long run, value stocks tend to outperform
growth stocks. The hml factor seeks to explain if and how much of a stock's
returns are attributable to a loading on value. See below for its construction. 46

ℎ𝑚𝑙 =

43

1
(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) –
2
1
(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ)
2

(1)

See footnote 16 above.

For instance, if the return of a stock in nominal dollars in month 𝑛 was $10, and in
month 𝑛 + 1 the return was $11, the CRSP database would display a stock_Ret in month
𝑛 + 1 of 10%.
44

45

See footnote 15 above.

46

See footnote 17 above.
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smb:
Pulled from Ken French’s website, the smb variable is the second
factor in Carhart's four-factor model and seeks to explain security returns
as a function of market capitalization. It measures the historical excess
returns of small capitalization stocks over large capitalization stocks.47

1

𝑠𝑚𝑏 = 3 (𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) −
1
3

(𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ)

(2)

mktrf:
Also pulled from Ken French’s website, mktrf is the market risk
premium, which is the difference in the market return and the risk-free rate
(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓 ), and the third factor in Carhart's four-factor model. Ken French
utilizes a multitude of US stock index returns found within CRSP to form
the overall market return.48 As for the risk-free rate, French utilizes the
one-month US Treasury bill rate, sourced from Ibbotson Associates, a
private company that provides research and services to financial services
companies. By taking the difference in the market returns and the risk-free

47

See footnote 17 above.

48

Includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX.
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rate, the mktrf factor seeks to explain the sensitivity of a stock to the
market.49

mom:
The fourth and final factor, called mom, is the momentum factor.
By attempting to control for price momentum, the asset pricing model
switches from a Fama French three-factor model to a Carhart four-factor
model. The momentum factor simulates a strategy wherein the highest
performing stocks over the past 12 months are bought and the worst
performing stocks over the past 12 months are sold short.50 The
momentum factor is constructed by taking the average returns from the
prior month of high performing small and large capitalization portfolios
and subtracting the average returns from the prior month of lowperforming small and large capitalization portfolios. A significant loading,
or a significant regression coefficient on the mom factor, would indicate a
price momentum stock, or that price momentum can partially explain a
stock's returns.51

49

See footnote 17 above.

50

Lee, Samuel. "Understanding Factor Models." Morningstar. February 26, 2014.
Accessed November 13, 2016.
http://ibd.morningstar.com/article/article.asp?id=636847&CN=brf295,http://ibd.mornings
tar.com/archive/archive.asp?inputs=days=14;frmtId=12, brf295.
51

See footnote 17 above.
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1

1

𝑚𝑜𝑚 = 2 (𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ) − 2 (𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑤)
(3)

IV.

Data set limitations

Despite the advantages of the complete data set (see section III.I), there are several
limitations worth discussing. First, because of various issues with the data, I had to
reduce the sample size. There were originally 276 buy orders in SIF’s trading data since
1996 when CMC began to track trades. 85 of the 276 buy orders were purchases of
exchange-traded funds (ETFs). Historically, the SIF has not purchased ETFs directly.
Instead, it uses them to invest excess cash from the selling of positions in other stocks.
Since buying these ETFs was not a decision that was a result of fundamental analysis but
rather an organizational decision, I removed them from the sample. Additionally, of the
total 276 buy orders, 71 companies were bought multiple times. I removed the additional
purchases of these stocks from my sample, considering only first-time purchases to avoid
corrupting the pre-event period beta estimation. Therefore, by only looking at company
stocks purchased once and removing ETF purchases, the sample size was reduced to 120
stocks.52 Next, I removed 38 stocks because there was no data for them in CRSP. After a
company is either bought by another company (due to an acquisition or merger), taken
private (bought by a financial sponsor), or gone bankrupt, CRSP removes them from the
database. The final complete data set has 82 stocks.

52

15 of the 120 stocks had multiple sell dates, meaning the SIF sold them off in
increments. I kept them in the sample because I am only analyzing the buying patterns of
the fund.
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In addition to being required to work with a smaller sample size, there are not 72
observations for each stock. The average was only 58 months’ worth of observations per
stock. The reason for CRSP not having 72 observations for each stock is that some
companies did not exist a full 72 months before the purchase date. Unfortunately, this
means that the pre-event period was not a full 60 months for every stock (see Table 2 for
more information), which reduces the precision of the beta estimates. In turn, this could
negatively impact the precision of the alpha calculations in the pre-purchase period.
Thirdly, for 80 individual monthly observations, CRSP gave two different returns.
Because there are 4,705 total observations, the duplicates made up only 1.7% of the data
set. Since the duplicate observations were not concentrated within any one stock, and to
err on the conservative side, I dropped the higher of the duplicate observations.
Finally, by using Ken French’s data, I did not create the factor returns myself. In
the next section, I will use the data described to test my hypothesis.
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IV.

Estimation and Results

To ascertain whether the stocks that the SIF buys outperform Carhart's four-factor
benchmark in the pre-purchase period and, if so, whether they are price momentum
stocks, I first calculate the difference between an individual stock’s return in the prepurchase period and the benchmark return in the pre-purchase period. The difference is
abnormal return, or alpha, because it is not explained by an asset pricing model or
benchmark. The existence of cumulative alpha over the course of the fund’s buying
history determines if the fund is buying of winners.
The first step in calculating alpha is determining the factor loadings, or
benchmark regression coefficients, in the pre-event period. Using a span of five years
provides a large enough sample to determine what each stock’s beta, or regression
coefficient, should be. To calculate the betas for each factor, I run a linear regression of
the excess returns of each stock onto the four-factor returns during the pre-event period.

𝐸𝑆𝑅𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡 + 𝐵ℎ𝑚𝑙 ℎ𝑚𝑙𝑡 + 𝐵𝑠𝑚𝑏 𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑡 + 𝐵𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓 𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡 + 𝐵𝑚𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑡 +
𝜀𝑡
where 𝐸𝑆𝑅𝑡 is excess security return and 𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡 , 𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑡 , ℎ𝑚𝑙𝑡 , 𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑡 are the
respective factor returns for month 𝑡.

(4)
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Table 4
Summary of regression coefficients

Coefficient Mean

Ticker
hml
smb**
mktrf**
mom

-0.2620
0.5752
1.1809
-0.1060

Obs.

73

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

1.4149
1.2344
1.0389
1.1870

-2.5790
-3.8350
-3.0920
-2.4170

7.6354
3.3841
4.8463
7.5184

** p < .001
This table represents the summary statistics for the results of 73 regressions. For instance, for any given stock in the preevent period, on average the beta for the size factor is .57.
Note: Due to a lack of data, betas could not be calculated for nine stocks. Thus, I dropped the nine stocks and ran 73
regressions.

Overall, only 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓 and 𝛽𝑠𝑚𝑏 , on average, are statistically significant at
conventional levels. The regression coefficient results demonstrate that the stocks the SIF
invested in loaded on 𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓 and 𝑠𝑚𝑏. In monthly terms, a significant positive loading
on 𝑠𝑚𝑏 means that for each percentage point a small capitalization stock beat a large
capitalization stock, the predicted return for an SIF stock rose by .57%, all other factors
remaining constant. Similarly, a positive loading on the 𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓 factor shows that SIF
tended to invest in high market beta stocks. On average, if the market rose one percentage
point, the predicted return for an SIF stock rose by about 1.2%.
The regression coefficients reveal that SIF's investment portfolio in the pre-event
period tilts towards small capitalization, high market beta stocks, with little exposure to
growth or price momentum stocks. In fact, only six stocks had positive and significant
momentum factors. Although the stocks do not load on price momentum in the pre-event
period, the first part of my hypothesis is unaffected. Rather, the insignificant loading
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indicates the SIF is not buying stocks sensitive to price momentum. Put another way,
price momentum does not explain the abnormal returns. This means the SIF is not buying
price momentum stocks but still could be buying winners overall.
Next, using the estimated betas, I calculate the monthly 𝑎̂𝑖 for each stock in the prepurchase period as follows:
𝑎̂𝑖 = 𝐸𝑆𝑅𝑡 − (𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡 ∗ 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓 ) − (𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑡 ∗ 𝛽𝑠𝑚𝑏 ) − (ℎ𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∗ 𝛽ℎ𝑚𝑙 ) − (𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑡 ∗
𝛽𝑚𝑜𝑚 )

(5)

where 𝐵ℎ𝑚𝑙 , 𝐵𝑠𝑚𝑏 , 𝐵𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓 , and 𝐵𝑚𝑜𝑚 are the value, size, market premium, and
momentum regression coefficients and all other variables are as previously
defined.

Next, I calculate the cumulative abnormal return for each stock (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 ) by adding up
each monthly 𝑎̂𝑖 for each stock.
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 = ∑12
̂𝑖
𝑖=1 𝑎

(6)
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Table 5
Summary of 𝐂𝐀𝐑 𝐬𝐭𝐨𝐜𝐤

CAR stock
Mean

0.1197

Standard Error

0.0961

Median

0.1209

Standard Deviation

0.8208

Minimum

-4.578

Maximum

2.6653

Count

73

Note: The standard error in this chart is not the one used in the t-statistic test. See below for more information.

̅̅̅̅̅̅ is equal to
Table 5 reveals that by taking an average of all the 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 , I find the 𝐶𝐴𝑅
~12%. In other words, on average, any stock that SIF purchased outperformed Carhart's
̅̅̅̅̅̅ is
four-factor benchmark by 12% over the previous 12 months. To prove the 𝐶𝐴𝑅
significant, I also calculate the standard error. To do so, I calculate the 𝜎𝑖 for each stock
using stock returns during the pre-event period, 𝜎𝐶𝐴𝑅 , and 𝜎𝐶𝐴𝑅
̅̅̅̅̅̅ as follows:

𝜎𝐶𝐴𝑅 = √12 × 𝜎𝑖
𝜎̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = (

√12
2
)√∑73
𝑖=1 𝜎𝑖
73

(7)
(8)

Once I calculate the 𝜎̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝐶𝐴𝑅 , I perform a t-test to ascertain the statistical likelihood that the
̅̅̅̅̅̅ is significantly different from zero. In particular, I calculate the t-statistic using the
𝐶𝐴𝑅
following equation:

27

𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =

𝑥̅ −𝑢0

(9)

𝑠 / √𝑛

̅̅̅̅̅̅ , 𝑢0 is zero, 𝑠 is 𝜎̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
where 𝑥̅ is 𝐶𝐴𝑅
𝐶𝐴𝑅 , and √𝑛 is the square root of the number of
observations.

̅̅̅̅̅̅ for all the stocks in the sample is .1197 or ~12%. The 𝜎̅̅̅̅̅̅
The 𝐶𝐴𝑅
𝐶𝐴𝑅 is .2177 or
̅̅̅̅̅̅ is equal to zero.
21.8%. The null hypothesis of the statistical hypothesis is that the 𝐶𝐴𝑅
To reject the null hypothesis, I run the t-test below.

𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =

̅̅̅̅̅̅ −0)
(𝐶𝐴𝑅
𝜎𝐶𝐴𝑅
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ / √73

(.1197 −0)

= .2177/√73 = 4.7

(10)

The t-statistic is equal to 4.7, which is significant at the .01% level.53 As such, I reject the
null hypothesis; the ̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝐶𝐴𝑅 is statistically different from zero, which means that the SIF is
buying winners.

53

Gerstman, Burt B. "StatPrimer (Version 7.0)." StatPrimer (Version 7.0). Accessed
November 15, 2016. http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/gerstman/StatPrimer.
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V.

Conclusion

Fundamental analysis is a particularly attractive investing strategy for investors.
Its relative simplicity makes it accessible by allowing even inexperienced investors to
employ it. However, when inexperienced investors do so, they produce an unintended
momentum-like pattern, often leaving money on the table.
The primary purpose of my thesis is to demonstrate that the fundamental analysis
inexperienced investors use may, in fact, produce a momentum-based trading pattern that
fails to capture undervalued stocks with the potential to generate excess returns over the
long term. I use the Student Investment Fund (SIF) at Claremont McKenna College
(CMC) as a proxy for inexperienced investors, analyze the buying patterns of the fund,
and determine if they roughly follow a rudimentary momentum strategy of buying
winners.54 My findings show that this is precisely what occurs. On average from 1996 to
2015, the stocks the SIF purchased had statistically significant annual abnormal returns of
12%. Although the insignificance of the momentum factor in the pre-event period means
that the abnormal returns are not attributable to price momentum, it does prove for the
SIF that their fundamental analysis investing results in buying winners.55
The secondary purpose of my thesis is to explain why this relationship exists.
Fundamental analysis relies on making intrinsic value calculations based on a deep
understanding of the firm's current and expected future condition through critical analysis

Winners were defined as stocks with abnormal returns above Carhart’s four factor
model in the year before purchase.
54

55

Reminder: winners are defined as stocks that have produced abnormal returns in the
pre-event period. They are not necessarily stocks that continue to outperform past the buy
date.
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of a company's financial statements. The valuation is linked directly to its accounting
numbers and other financials. A firm with good accounting numbers or trends has a high
projected intrinsic value and is the type of firm likely to be invested in by an
inexperienced investor employing fundamental analysis. Since stock prices are leading
indicators, stock prices will increase in anticipation of good accounting numbers, which
makes it difficult for fundamental analysis to get in front of the market. When a
fundamental analysis investor views the numbers, he or she will be viewing old data. The
stock will have already reacted to any good numbers or trends by the time of the
investment. Thus, by investing using fundamental analysis, inexperienced investors may
unwittingly be buying stocks that have done well in the recent past, reflecting
rudimentary momentum. While it may be true that a stock with a rising price could still
be undervalued, the likelihood of that occurrence is less compelling because the margin
for error in that circumstance is much smaller. Investors like Graham and Buffett differ
from traditional investors because they add another condition to focus their analyses.
They invest according to a margin of safety, requiring at least a 50% discount on the
stock price to its intrinsic value.56 This significant margin sensitizes their assumptions
and assures, even with inaccurate intrinsic value calculations, that the investment will
make money. In contrast to the SIF, the significant margin of safety will ensure that most
of the time investments are not in stocks that have significantly outperformed in the
recent past. The SIF, despite their inexperience and consequently inaccurate intrinsic
value calculations, has a much smaller margin of safety than Graham.

56

See footnote one above.
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Aside from lagging the stock price, the time constraints students face could
amplify the relationship between fundamental analysis and selecting winners. A student
participates in the SIF as an extra-curricular activity and thus does not have the time to
research enough companies to evaluate which stocks are trading at significant discounts.
They instead choose to analyze companies they know about or find a company that has
been in the news. For instance, recent evidence suggests that stocks in the news are more
likely to be traded. Engelberg and Parsons (2011)57 argue that an increase in press
coverage strongly predicts an increase in trading volume and Fang, Peress, and Zheng
(2014)58 find that stocks receiving media coverage are bought more heavily by mutual
funds. Using the news as a screening tool, students in the SIF narrow the universe of
stocks to invest in, applying fundamental analysis to already well-known stocks. Lin
(2011)59 finds that the more media coverage a stock receives, the more it outperforms its
peers that do not receive media attention. If the SIF does utilize the news as a screen to
which they apply fundamental analysis, it could explain why the SIF buys winners and
not Graham’s margin of safety stocks.

57

Engelberg, Joseph E., and Christopher A. Parsons. "The Causal Impact of Media in
Financial Markets." The Journal of Finance 66, no. 1 (2011): 67-97. doi:10.1111/j.15406261.2010.01626.x.
58

Fang, Lily H., Joel Peress, and Lu Zheng. "Does Media Coverage of Stocks Affect
Mutual Funds' Trading and Performance?" Review of Financial Studies 27, no. 12 (2014):
3441-466. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhu056.
59

Lin, Shengle. "Stock Return and Financial Media Coverage Bias." October 2011.
Accessed November 30, 2016.
http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/groups/finance/Lin_JobMktPaper.pdf.
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The implications of my findings are important to understanding the shortcomings
of fundamental analysis. Although tempting to use stocks in the news, it is likely that
they have already performed well, and thus the upside of investing in them as
undervalued assets is diminished. Achieving the same level of success as Graham and
Buffet is difficult, but it is nearly impossible if you ignore a central and often overlooked
tenet of fundamental analysis: it is harder to find a good deal if the price has already
risen. My advice to the aspiring investor based on the results of this thesis would be to
use fundamental analysis like Graham and not like the SIF: employ fundamental analysis
to find stocks with severely depressed stock prices and a large margin of safety. The more
inexperienced one is, the larger the margin of safety should be to compensate for the
inaccuracy of the valuation. Indeed, the SIF has failed to duplicate Graham's 17%
average annual return from 1934 to 195660 and Buffet's 20% average annual over the past
50 years.61 Its average annual return since 1996 is 7.12%, underperforming the market by
.48%. By buying winners, the SIF is probably buying fully valued firms, and thus it
exposes itself to a random walk. Finding such severely undervalued companies like
Graham is tough, or else everyone would do it. So, in the future, the SIF should consider
remaining more passively invested and spending more time on due diligence for each
individual investment idea. Assuming students do not wait until the last minute to find a

Loth, Richard. “The Greatest Investors: Benjamin Graham.” Investopedia. Accessed
December 4, 2016.
http://www.investopedia.com/university/greatest/benjamingraham.asp.
60

Sommer, Jeff. “Warren Buffett’s Awesome Feat at Berkshire Hathaway, Revisited.”
New York Times. March 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/yourmoney/warren-buffetts-awesome-feat-at-berkshire-hathaway-revisited.html?_r=0.
61
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company to pitch, a more passively managed fund would alleviate the time constraint
problem students have and increase the chances of finding a company Graham might
invest in.
There is much potential future research on the topic. For instance, a similar
analysis on the SIF or an equivalent organization should be completed and include a
detailed audit of how students sourced each investment idea to further distinguish the
difference between Graham's and the inexperienced investor's fundamental analysis.
Additionally, the analysis should be performed on professional funds that use
fundamental analysis to see if the effect persists. Third, given what we now know about
the SIF, its investment strategy, and its resulting trading pattern, investigating the specific
conditions of the SIF that could amplify the momentum effect could yield interesting
insights. While time constraints certainly limit a student's ability to performed detailed
due diligence, other factors could also influence a student's success with employing
fundamental analysis. For instance, do students feel pressure to pitch stocks that have
recently performed well because people do not like pitching losers? Is risk-aversion
preventing students from investing in beaten down securities?
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